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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 In recent years, the South African Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, and several High Courts have served as anti-corruption fighters. Some of 
the judicial rulings are extraordinary in scope. In Glenister v. President of South Africa 
(Glenister II), the Constitutional Court invalidated the existence of an independent 
government entity designed to fight corruption because the entity was too weak.1 
Another Constitutional Court decision nullified a presidential appointment to a 
national prosecuting position because of the President’s unwillingness to pay heed to 
the appointee’s integrity problems.2
 In Nkabinde v. Judicial Service Commission, the South Gauteng High Court 
allowed an important disciplinary investigation involving Western Cape High Court 
Judge John Hlophe’s alleged ex parte tampering with two Constitutional Court 
Justices, in a legal matter that implicated President Jacob Zuma, to go forward.3 And 
in Democratic Alliance v. Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (the “Spy Tapes” 
case), the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that the Democratic Alliance had the 
right to examine documents and audiotapes that explained why an investigation into 
possible financial corruption by Zuma was halted.4
 These decisions reveal a risky yet important role for courts in a “dominant party 
democracy” in which the African National Congress’s (ANC) dominance is one 
source of corruption.5 Moreover, the ANC has criticized the Constitutional Court 
on several occasions.6 In 2012, the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development authorized an academic study to consider whether the Court has been 
sufficiently transformative.7 Many suspect the study was an excuse to further criticize 
1. 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at para. 248.
2. See Democratic All. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC) at paras. 86–89. The 
appointee, Menzi Simelane, was found to have made false allegations against the previous National 
Director of Public Prosecutions during the Ginwala Commission. Id. at paras. 50–53.
3. 2014 (12) BCLR 1477 (GJ) at paras. 1–3, 93, 121–23. A full bench of the High Court subsequently 
affirmed the decision. Ernest Mabuza, Ruling Paves Way For Conduct Tribunal to Investigate Judge 
Hlophe, Bus. Day (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/law/2014/11/21/ruling-paves-
way-for-conduct-tribunal-to-investigate-judge-hlophe. The two Constitutional Court Justices have 
now sought a judgment reversing that decision from the Supreme Court of Appeal, which will further 
delay the matter. See Franny Rabkin, Top Judges Seek to Appeal, Bus. Day (Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.
bdlive.co.za/national/law/2015/01/21/top-judges-seek-to-appeal.
4. 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) at paras. 37, 52. The Democratic Alliance is an opposing party to the ANC, the 
current dominant political party. Id. at para. 2.
5. See Sujit Choudhry, ‘He Had a Mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National 
Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy, 2 Const. Ct. Rev. 1, 3 (2009); Zuma, ANC in ‘Eternal 
Corruption Scheme,’ News24 (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Zuma-
ANC-in-eternal-corruption-scheme-20141010. 
6. For examples of ANC criticisms, see Hamadziripi Tamukamoyo, Double Speak About Judicial Reform in 
South Africa Raises Alarm Bells, ISS Africa (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/double-
speak-about-judicial-reform-in-south-africa-raises-alarm-bells.
7. See Dep’t of Just. and Const. Dev., Discussion Document on the Transformation of the 
Judicial System and the Role of the Judiciary in the Developmental South African State 
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the Court.8 This raises the question of whether the courts have gone too far in these 
cases, especially given their democratic fragility and given that courts in other 
countries would likely not have been so bold. In addition, some scholars have 
commented on the supposed weakness of the judicial reasoning in these cases,9 which 
makes them even more controversial.
 Part II.A of this essay examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s handling of various 
scandals, particularly Watergate and the situations involving Whitewater and Monica 
Lewinsky, that have parallels to the allegations that Zuma participated in criminal 
financial misconduct10 and committed sexual assault.11 Comparisons of the structural 
features of constitutions are difficult, but it is still useful to note that high-level 
corruption is not merely a developing country problem. Part II.B looks at the 
scholarly criticisms of Glenister II. Part II.C argues that the South African courts 
must play an active role in combatting corruption for pragmatic reasons, at least for 
the time being. Part III concludes the paper.
ii. thE COUrt as COrrUptiOn fightEr
 A. The U.S. Example
 If the U.S. Supreme Court received a claim, akin to that in Glenister II, that a 
national anti-corruption body was too weak, the Court would likely dismiss the case, 
either for lack of standing12 or under the political question doctrine.13 Similarly, a 
lawsuit alleging that a U.S. President did not deliberate sufficiently over a Cabinet 
appointee’s supposed lack of integrity—as in Democratic Alliance v. President of the 
(Feb. 2012), http://www.justice.gov.za/docs/other-docs/20120228-transf-jud.pdf. To my knowledge, 
the academic review of whether the Constitutional Court is transformative enough is still ongoing.
8. See, e.g., Pierre de Vos, Mixed Signals on the Review of our Courts, Constitutionally Speaking (Feb. 
29, 2012), http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/mixed-signals-on-the-review-of-our-courts/.
9. See K. Malan, Reassessing Judicial Independence and Impartiality Against the Backdrop of Judicial 
Appointments in South Africa, 17 Potchefstroom Electronic L.J., 2014, at 1964, 2010–14, http://
www.nwu.ac.za/sites/www.nwu.ac.za/files/files/p-per/issuepages/2014volume17no5/2014%2817%295
Malan.pdf; see also infra notes 62–65.
10. David Smith, Jacob Zuma Accused of Corruption ‘on a Grand Scale’ in South Africa, The Guardian (Nov. 
29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/29/jacob-zuma-accused-corruption-south-
africa.
11. Jacob Zuma Cleared of Rape, The Guardian (May 8, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/
may/08/aids.southafrica.
12. The U.S. doctrine of standing requires that a plaintiff allege “personal injury fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). The entity in Glenister II purportedly lacked adequate power as 
opposed to having excess authority that could injure someone.
13. The U.S. political question doctrine renders a question before a court non-justiciable when there is a 
“textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or 
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it,” among other factors. Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
186
CORRUPTION CASES AND SEPARATION OF POWERS NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
Republic of South Africa14—would likely be dismissed as a political question. But other 
U.S. Supreme Court cases have ruled on issues of separation of powers and corruption.
 One U.S. Supreme Court case that actually links the scandals that enveloped 
President Richard M. Nixon (Watergate) and President William J. Clinton 
(Whitewater/Lewinsky) is Morrison v. Olson.15 Congress enacted Title VI of the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (the “Independent Counsel Act”) because Nixon 
had fired Archibald Cox, the first special prosecutor investigating his involvement in 
the Watergate scandal, and it had been difficult to find another independent attorney 
to continue.16 Moreover, the second special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, was also 
vulnerable to losing his position, though he eventually obtained the audiotapes that 
were the key to Nixon’s demise in the Supreme Court case of United States v. Nixon.17 
After Watergate, the Independent Counsel Act authorized the U.S. Attorney 
General to initially investigate and report to a three-judge panel whether there was 
sufficient reason to appoint such a counsel, who could not be fired except for cause.18 
 In Morrison, the Court addressed the President’s power under Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution.19 The issue was whether the Independent Counsel position 
violated separation of powers, as the appointee did not fit neatly into the prosecutorial 
hierarchy of the executive branch and had significant unchecked power.20
 Article II of the U.S. Constitution differentiates between “inferior” and 
“principal” executive officers in the federal government.21 The President appoints 
principal officers upon the Senate’s advice and consent, which requires approval by a 
majority of the Senate.22 Principal officers also serve at the will of the President, who 
can generally remove them with or without cause, given the importance of an 
administration’s ability to work effectively on important matters.23 Under Article II, 
14. 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC).
15. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
16. Carol Elder Bruce, An Independent Counsel Law Needs to be Restored, N.Y. Times: The Opinion Pages 
Room for Debate (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-any-
good-come-of-watergate/an-independent-counsel-law-needs-to-be-restored; Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon 
Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, Wash. Post (Oct. 21, 1973), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/articles/102173-2.htm. Cox’s f iring is 
similar to the ANC government’s decision to disband the powerful Scorpions anti-corruption unit in 
that Cox and the Scorpions were both removed by political foes being investigated for corruption or 
scandal. Scorpions Stung: South Africa’s Special Crime-Busting Team May Be On Its Way Out, The 
Economist (May 8, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/11333160.
17. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). This echoes the audiotapes controversy in the South African Spy Tapes case. See 
Spy Tapes: Scorpions Boss Wanted to Charge Zuma, Mail & Guardian (Sept. 28, 2014), http://mg.co.za/
article/2014-09-28-spy-tapes-scorpions-boss-wanted-to-charge-zuma-report.
18. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660–63, 661 n.3.
19. Id. at 659–60. 
20. Id. 
21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–72.
22. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–72.
23. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688–90.
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“Congress may . . . vest the [a]ppointment of . . . inferior [o]fficers . . . in the President 
. . . the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”24 A high-ranking member 
of the President’s Cabinet, such as the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
would likely be an example of a principal officer.25 By contrast, the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of Iowa, who is under the supervision and domain 
of the U.S. Attorney General, would likely be deemed an inferior officer due to the 
position’s limited authority.26
 Under the Independent Counsel Act, the U.S. Attorney General did not exercise 
the same authority over the Independent Counsel that it exercised over U.S. 
Attorneys, and the Independent Counsel usually had just one target and virtually 
unlimited resources.27 Moreover, members of the judicial branch, rather than the 
executive branch, selected the Independent Counsel.28 The Supreme Court upheld 
the law based on several technical grounds and on the equitable need to have someone 
independent to investigate high-ranking officials.29 The Court therefore decided the 
restrictions on the President’s ability to remove an Independent Counsel under the 
Independent Counsel Act were permitted and noted that there were other relatively 
independent agencies in existence.30
 Justice Antonin Scalia delivered a powerful lone dissent arguing that the 
Independent Counsel had the power of a principal officer under Article II and that 
the Independent Counsel Act’s appointment and removal mechanisms were not 
reconcilable with the three branches of government.31 Scalia wrote that the 
Independent Counsel was essentially outside the executive branch.32 Moreover, Scalia 
was concerned that unlike ordinary prosecutors, the Independent Counsel would 
have virtually unlimited funds to focus on one or two main targets.33
 The Independent Counsel Act subsequently became an issue during the Clinton 
presidency when Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr aggressively investigated both 
the Whitewater real estate deal and the allegations that Clinton had committed 
perjury about having sexual relations with then-White House intern Monica 
24. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
25. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is appointed by the President in accordance with the 
advice and consent procedure under Article II. See The Executive Branch, The White House, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/1600/executive-branch (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
26. E.g., United States v. Rijo, 87 F. Supp. 2d 69, 70 (D. P.R. 2000) (“United States Attorneys . . . have 
consistently been held to be inferior officers . . . .”).
27. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–83.
28. Id. at 661, 677.
29. See id. at 696–97.
30. Id. at 687–97.
31. Id. at 697–734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 703, 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Lewinsky.34 A pending civil lawsuit by Paula Jones alleging that Clinton had sexually 
harassed her when she was a state employee during his tenure as Governor of 
Arkansas35 opened the door to more Lewinsky evidence.36 In Clinton v. Jones, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Jones civil lawsuit could proceed despite Clinton’s 
efforts to seek a stay or a form of immunity.37 The Court determined that the lawsuit 
would not unduly interfere with the President’s functions.38 Unlike the sexual assault 
case in which Zuma was controversially acquitted,39 however, no criminal prosecution 
was brought against Clinton for his alleged sexual overtures towards Jones.40 In the 
end, Starr spent over forty million dollars in public funds and the U.S. Senate 
acquitted Clinton during impeachment proceedings.41 Clinton remains popular 
today,42 and Zuma’s ANC remains dominant.43 The Independent Counsel Act expired 
in 1999, and in retrospect, some liberal scholars believe, Scalia’s dissent in Morrison 
was right.44
 Admittedly, there is a key distinction between the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis 
of the Independent Counsel Act and the anti-corruption entity at issue in Glenister 
II. One of the constitutional issues in Morrison was whether the Independent Counsel 
was too powerful.45 By contrast, the issue in Glenister II was whether the entity was 
sufficiently strong or independent.46 But both cases shed light on how their respective 
judiciaries have policed corruption.
34. See Ken Gormley, The Death of American Virtue: Clinton vs. Starr 213, 407 (2010).
35. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
36. See Peter Baker, Clinton Denied Initiating Job Help for Lewinsky, Wash. Post (Mar. 5, 1998), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/jones030598.htm. 
37. 520 U.S. at 705–06.
38. Id. at 708.
39. S. Africa’s Zuma Cleared of Rape, BBC News (May 8, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4750731.stm.
40. See Josh Gerstein, Clinton Eligible, Once Again, to Practice Law, N.Y. Sun (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.
nysun.com/national/clinton-eligible-once-again-to-practice-law/25965/.
41. Naftali Bendavid & James Warren, Hubbell Deals with Starr, Agrees to Plead Guilty to Cover-up Charge, 
Chi. Trib. ( June 29, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-06-29/news/9906290100_1_
webster-hubbell-hillary-clinton-castle-grande.
42. See Matt Berman, Bill Clinton is the Best Friend Democrats Have for 2014, Nat’l J. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://
www.nationaljournal.com/politics/bill-clinton-is-the-best-friend-democrats-have-for-2014-20140312.
43. See Presidents of the African National Congress, African Nat’l Congress, www.anc.org.za/show.
php?id=3999 (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (showing President Zuma’s 2012 election to a second term 
ending in 2017).
44. See Tasha Vincent, The Evolution of Witch Hunting?: The Life and Death of the Independent Counsel Act, 
Infoplease, http://www.infoplease.com/spot/indepcounsel1.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
45. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988).
46. 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at paras. 160, 163. 
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 B. Glenister II
 Several scholars have criticized the Glenister II majority’s legal reasoning—but 
here the critics are wrong. This section will examine these criticisms and Glenister 
II ’s likely legacy, especially in light of further judicial developments.
 In Glenister II, the Constitutional Court addressed the independence of a new 
prosecutorial entity, the Hawks.47 The Hawks were created because a powerful anti-
corruption unit, known as the Scorpions—that had been located in the relatively 
independent National Prosecuting Authority48—was disbanded just at it appeared to 
be preparing an indictment against Zuma for financial improprieties.49 The Court 
ruled that the Hawks—who now came under the supervision of the Minister of 
Police—were not independent enough for predominantly two reasons: (1) the chances 
for government interference in their mission, and (2) the lack of meaningful job 
security.50
 The most controversial part of Glenister II was the Constitutional Court’s 
emphasis on how various international conventions required a more independent 
anti-corruption agency.51 The Court specifically cited the United Nations (UN) 
Convention against Corruption,52 which states, “[e]ach State Party shall grant the 
body [tasked with preventing corruption] . . . the necessary independence . . . to carry 
out its . . . functions effectively and free from any undue influence.”53 What transformed 
the issues in Glenister II into constitutional issues rather than international law and 
policy issues? The Court found that international law influenced how the relevant 
Bill of Rights provisions should be interpreted.54 Thus, the majority ruled that the 
Hawks’ lack of independence violated section 7 of the Constitution, because “[t]he 
state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights,”55 and 
47. Id. at para. 160.
48. The National Prosecuting Authority was created by section 179 of the South African Constitution for 
the purpose of conducting criminal trials on behalf of the state. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 179.
49. See Mmanaledi Mataboge & Lionel Faull, Scorpions Disbanding Unconstitutional, Mail & Guardian 
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-18-scorpions-disbanding-unconstitutional; Wendell 
Roelf, South Africa’s Scorpion Crimefighters to be Disbanded, Reuters, (Feb. 12, 2008, 11:19 A.M.), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/12/us-safrica-scorpions-idUSL1223114320080212. A Zuma confidant 
had already been convicted in a related case involving the arms scandal. Mataboge & Faull, supra.
50. See Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at para. 248. For example, even the Hawks’ salaries were decided by the 
officials they might investigate. Id. at para. 227.
51. Id. at paras. 179 –202. 
52. Id. at para. 183.
53. G.A. Res. 58/4, annex, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 6, ¶ 2 (adopted Oct. 31, 
2003), https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.
pdf. South Africa is a signatory to the Convention. Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at para. 85 & n.64 
(Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).
54. Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at paras. 192–94, 201 –02.
55. Id. at paras. 166–78, 194, 200 (quoting S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 7(2)).
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noted that corruption undermines democracy, dignity, equality, freedom, and the 
rule of law.56
 According to the Glenister II dissent, however, the establishment of the Hawks 
was a parliamentary policy matter that the Court could not second-guess if the entity 
met basic elements of independence.57 The dissent maintained that whether the 
Hawks were as independent as the Scorpions was irrelevant and that the focus should 
be on rationality, not retrogression (a comparison with the prior institution).58 
Moreover, international law did not bind the government because the conventions 
were not self-executing.59 The dissent further argued that the majority misinterpreted 
international law since international law supposedly did not require the anti-corruption 
entity to have as much independence as the majority had ruled.60 It was a rare, closely 
divided, 5–4 decision, akin to the U.S. Supreme Court’s most controversial cases.61 
 Scholars like Samuel Issacharoff,62 Theunis Roux,63 and Ziyad Motala64 have 
criticized the Glenister II Court’s purportedly confused reasoning and reliance on 
international law. Motala virtually accuses the Court of lawlessness.65 Pierre de Vos,66 
George Devenish,67 and Justice Edwin Cameron68 have authored defenses. 
Determining the correctness of the criticism requires an analysis of how international 
law was used in Glenister II. One of the most detailed scholarly examinations is by 
Juha Tuovinen, who argues that both the majority and the dissent were wrong.69 First, 
a little background.
56. Id. at para. 170.
57. Id. at paras. 65–68 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).
58. Id. at paras. 59, 68, 73 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting). The majority disagreed by pointing out how 
retrogression affected public perceptions of corruption in the democracy. Id. at paras. 209–10.
59. Id. at paras. 85–99 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).
60. Id. at paras. 117–24 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).
61. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012).
62. Samuel Issacharoff, The Democratic Risk to Democratic Transitions, 5 Const. Ct. Rev. 1, 27–30 (2013).
63. Theunis Roux, The South African Constitutional Court’s Democratic Rights Jurisprudence, 5 Const. Ct. 
Rev. 33, 69–70 (2013).
64. Ziyad Motala, Divination Through a Strange Lens, Times Live (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.timeslive.
co.za/opinion/columnists/2011/03/26/divination-through-a-strange-lens. 
65. Id.
66. Pierre de Vos, How Not to Criticise a Court Judgment, Constitutionally Speaking (Mar. 28, 2011), 
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/how-not-to-criticise-a-court-judgment/.
67. George Devenish, The Scorpions vs The Hawks – A Royal Battle, IFAISA (Aug. 11, 2010), http://
accountabilitynow.org.za/scorpions-vs-hawks-royal-battle/.
68. Edwin Cameron, Constitutionalism, Rights, and International Law: The Glenister Decision, 23 Duke J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 389 (2013).
69. Juha Tuovinen, The Role of International Law in Constitutional Adjudication: Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa, 130 SALJ 661 (2013).
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 The South African Constitution is dualist in that the President may enter into 
treaties on behalf of the nation, but the treaties are not self-executing.70 The treaties 
must be ratified by Parliament, and implementing legislation makes them binding 
law.71 South Africa also has a unique constitutional provision, section 39, which 
specifies that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court . . . must consider 
international law; and . . . may consider foreign law.”72 Thus, international law can be 
binding statutory law in South Africa or instead, it can provide interpretive guidance 
regarding the Constitution. These two functions differ, especially since the 
interpretive role has a significant discretionary and constitutional component.
 Tuovinen argues that the Glenister II majority failed to make clear how they used 
international law to reach their decision.73 For example, the majority, jointly authored 
by Justice Cameron and Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke, confusingly used 
different terms to describe the impact of international law.74 Moreover, neither 
international law nor South African legislation explicitly requires a fully autonomous 
and independent anti-corruption agency.75 In addition, South Africa’s executive 
branch signed and approved certain major international anti-corruption conventions, 
but they had not apparently been ratified by Parliament or enacted into domestic 
law.76 These are powerful arguments.
 Tuovinen also criticizes the dissent for its view that these international conventions 
have virtually no impact and that establishing the Hawks was purely a domestic 
parliamentary policy decision.77 He argues that the dissent’s position is inconsistent with 
the Constitution’s discussion of the potentially “binding” or interpretive impact of 
international law.78 In the end, he advocates for the Court to adopt a dialogical approach 
in which international law is fully considered and the substantive reasons for allowing it 
to influence constitutional law are fleshed out comprehensively.79 Tuovinen believes that 
both the majority and the dissent failed to do this.80
 While the majority’s explanations of how it relied on international law vary in 
degree of merit, Tuovinen goes too far in saying the majority failed to engage in 
70. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 231.
71. Id. This is similar to many countries, including the United States.
72. S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 39(1)(b)–(c).
73. Tuovinen, supra note 69, at 664–67. For more of Tuovinen’s scholarly examination of the Glenister II 
decision, see Juha Tuovinen, What to Do with International Law? Three Flaws in Glenister, 5 Const. Ct. 
Rev. 434 (2013).
74. Tuovinen, supra note 69, at 665–66.
75. Id. at 662.
76. Id. at 662–66. 
77. See id. at 667 –69; see also Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) at paras. 99–103 (Ngcobo, CJ., dissenting).
78. See Tuovinen, supra note 69, at 668 –69, 671–72.
79. See id. at 671–72.
80. Id. at 669, 671–72. Tuovinen acknowledges, however, that the varied anti-corruption conventions at 
issue require South Africa to have an anti-corruption entity with some level of independence. Id. at 662.
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sufficient substantive reasoning.81 I view the Court’s use of international law as 
falling into the category of clarifying the meaning of various other constitutional 
provisions. Indeed, the majority made a strong and comprehensive argument about 
why international law should be constitutionally influential.82
 For example, the Constitutional Court pointed out that when South Africa 
signed the UN Convention against Corruption, then-Minister for the Public Service 
and Administration Geraldine J. Fraser-Moleketi said:
Corruption is a common feature in all political systems, despite the differences 
that may exist in their governing philosophies or their geography. Nation-
states are increasingly aware that corruption presents a serious threat to their 
core principles and values, and hinders social and economic development. As 
a result, there has been a growing acceptance of the need to address the 
problem in a coordinated, comprehensive and sustainable way.83
 If anything, the Minister’s assertions amount to drastic understatement given the 
scope of the governmental corruption problem. The New York Times Magazine even 
ran a feature story on corruption in South Africa and the country’s new female Public 
Protector.84 South Africa is also a signatory to the African Union Convention (which 
condemns corruption) and to the Southern African Development Community 
Protocol against Corruption.85
 South Africa’s own Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act is 
designed to implement international conventions such as the UN Convention against 
Corruption.86 The Constitutional Court eventually described four specific parts of 
the South African Constitution that demonstrate that key anti-corruption 
international law principles are embraced in South African law.87
 The Court then linked international law and the Constitution even more 
explicitly:
81. Another scholar agrees. See Bonita Meyersfeld, Domesticating International Standards: The Direction of 
International Human Rights Law in South Africa, 5 Const. Ct. Rev. 398, 407 (2013) (approving of the 
Court’s statement that it is “appropriating” international law). But see Franziska Sucker, Approval of an 
International Treaty in Parliament: How Does Section 231(2) ‘Bind the Republic’?, 5 Const. Ct. Rev. 416, 
422–23, 429–33 (2013) (critiquing Glenister II ’s lack of substantive reasoning).
82. See Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at paras. 170–202. The more than twenty paragraphs of analysis 
regarding the relationship between international law and the Constitution certainly satisfy the need for 
substantive reasoning. 
83. Id. at para. 168 (quoting Geraldine J. Fraser-Moleketi, Minister for the Public Service and 
Administration South Africa, Opening Statement on the Occasion of the Signing Ceremony of the UN 
Convention against Corruption (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www.un.org/webcast/merida/statements/
safri_2031209en.htm).
84. Alexis Okeowo, Can Thulisile Madonsela Save South Africa From Itself?, N.Y. Times Mag. (June 16, 
2015), http://nyti.ms/1ejRMyy.
85. Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at para. 169 & nn.137–38.
86. Id. at para. 170–71.
87. Id. at para. 179 (citing S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 39(1)(b); id. §§ 231–233).
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The obligations in these Conventions are clear and they are unequivocal. They 
impose on the Republic the duty in international law to create an anti-
corruption unit that has the necessary independence. That duty exists not only 
in the international sphere, and is enforceable not only there. Our Constitution 
appropriates the obligation for itself, and draws it deeply into its heart, by 
requiring the state to fulfil it in the domestic sphere. In understanding how it 
does so, the starting point is section 7(2), which requires the state to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. This Court has 
held that in some circumstances this provision imposes a positive obligation on 
the state and its organs “to provide appropriate protection to everyone through 
laws and structures designed to afford such protection.” Implicit in section 7(2) 
is the requirement that the steps the state takes to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil constitutional rights must be reasonable and effective.88
 The Court further elaborated:
That the Republic is bound under international law to create an anti-corruption 
unit with appropriate independence is of the foremost interpretive significance 
in determining whether the state has fulfilled its duty to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, as section 7(2) requires. 
Section 7(2) implicitly demands that the steps the state takes must be 
reasonable. To create an anti-corruption unit that is not adequately independent 
would not constitute a reasonable step. In reaching this conclusion, the fact 
that section 231(2) provides that an international agreement that Parliament 
ratifies “binds the Republic” is of prime significance. It makes it unreasonable 
for the state, in fulfilling its obligations under section 7(2), to create an anti-
corruption entity that lacks sufficient independence.89
This reasoning repudiates Tuovinen’s contention that the Court’s majority lacked 
sufficient “substantive reasoning” to justify its strict anti-corruption interpretation of 
international law and the Constitution.90 Additionally, the majority provided forty-
three paragraphs on the Hawks’ deficiencies.91 This is more than adequate substantive 
reasoning.
 C. A Pragmatic Legal Coda
 I add a pragmatic legal argument in favor of Glenister II: The majority’s approach 
may be the only way to preserve democracy in a dominant party state, and preserving 
democracy is the essence of the South African Constitution.92 Without the protections 
88. Id. at para. 189 (quoting Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Sec. 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at para. 44).
89. Id. at para. 194.
90. Tuovinen, supra note 69, at 666–67. An article authored by Justice Cameron provided further rejoinders. 
Cameron, supra note 68.
91. Glenister II, 2011 (3) SA 347 at paras. 208–51. The vulnerability of the Hawks is not a mere abstraction. 
See Masego Rahlaga, Hawks Boss’s Unlawful Suspension Overturned, Eyewitness News (Jan. 23, 2015), 
http://ewn.co.za/2015/01/23/Anwa-Dramats-unlawful-suspension-overturned.
92. See generally Mark S. Kende, Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the 
United States (2009) (discussing the Court’s interpretive approach of “transformative pragmatism”). 
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of a fully independent entity, there is no reason to assume that the ANC will refrain 
from engaging in more drastic actions to curtail opposition, including that of the 
judicial branch.93 I say this with no view that the opposition parties are better, but 
with the realization that absolute power can corrupt absolutely. Glenister II is already a 
bellwether case that will help influence the various South African courts addressing 
other corruption issues.94 The Constitutional Court’s insistence on the creation of a 
truly independent agency is reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court’s support for the 
practical necessity of a Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland.95 In each 
case, the institution was not explicitly authorized by the respective constitution.
 Numerous South African corruption cases are still pending. In late September of 
2014, the South Gauteng High Court in Nkabinde v. Judicial Service Commission 
ruled that the special judicial services tribunal investigating Judge Hlophe’s actions 
was legitimate and could continue, contrary to the views and desires of Hlophe and 
the two Constitutional Court Justices that Hlophe contacted.96 The Judicial Service 
Commission had originally dismissed a complaint against Hlophe in 2009.97 Three 
years later, however, the Commission decided to reinvestigate the matter pursuant to 
an amended statute.98 The High Court rejected arguments that Hlophe was being 
subjected to illegal retroactive punishment based on the new statutory provisions.99 
The court said the statutory changes were mainly procedural and did not alter 
Hlophe’s substantive rights.100 The court also rejected the argument that the 
complaint in the earlier proceedings did not comply with the requirements of the 
amended statute.101 One can see how the High Court was fighting a kind of legal 
formalism—like that found in the Glenister II dissent—and how it was unwilling to 
countenance easy excuses to avoid examining corruption. Unfortunately, the Hlophe 
matter will be pursued to the Supreme Court of Appeal,102 meaning the public must 
continue to wait and have Judge Hlophe serve under a cloud of uncertainty. But the 
93. See, e.g., Karl Beck, South Africa: Democracy, Rule of Law, and the Future, Freedom House (Mar. 29, 
2012), https://freedomhouse.org/blog/south-africa-democracy-rule-law-and-future (discussing the 
ANC’s threats to put tighter controls on the judiciary).
94. See generally Helen Suzman Found. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. (Glenister III) 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC).
95. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
96. 2014 (12) BCLR 1477 (GJ) at para. 121. It would seem that these Justices should have professional 
ethical obligations to cooperate fully with the investigation.
97. Id. at para. 30.
98. Id. at para. 37.
99. Id. at para. 121.
100. Id.
101. Id. at para. 122.
102. Rabkin, supra note 3.
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right to appeal is a price of justice. It is distressing, though, that the two Constitutional 
Court Justices who were involved support the appeal.103
 The Constitutional Court has also decided Glenister III.104 After Glenister II, 
Parliament modified the statute governing the Hawks, but applicant Hugh Glenister 
and the Helen Suzman Foundation, using much of Glenister II ’s reasoning, argued 
that this new entity is still not independent enough.105 In Glenister III, the 
Constitutional Court agreed that the power of the Minister of Police to renew Hawk 
employees’ positions and to suspend Hawk employees without pay for disciplinary 
reasons compromised the entity’s independence.106
 Even the Spy Tapes case, which may reveal why the Scorpions’ investigation into 
Zuma’s financial dealings was halted, has not fully concluded, though the Democratic 
Alliance finally got the tapes.107 There are apparently court limitations on the tapes’ 
usage.108 Nonetheless, the Democratic Alliance is now relying on new information to 
seek reexamination of the decision not to charge Zuma.109 Interestingly, the National 
Prosecuting Authority opposes this request.110
iii. COnCLUsiOn
 South Africa has been fortunate that higher courts have been brave, and that 
judicial credibility does not yet seem too fragile to confront corruption, despite 
attacks from the ANC. Indeed, a doctrinal paradox is that the South African courts 
have, in these areas, apparently created greater judicial authority (just by adjudicating 
cases, as opposed to labeling them a political question or dismissing on standing 
grounds) than exists in the U.S. system, where the judiciary is often called “activist” 
in the extreme.111 This shows that South African courts are taking a significant risk.
 Hopefully a stronger South African anti-corruption agency can reduce pressure 
on the courts. It is clear that the Constitutional Court’s reliance on international law 
has been vital in bolstering the judicial battle against corruption and in limiting 
ANC power. Great concerns, however, remain, as shown by the failure of the 
Constitutional Court Justices to fully cooperate in the seemingly never-ending Judge 
103. Id.; see also Franny Rabkin, Law Matters: The Other Side of the Bench, Bus. Day (Jan. 22, 2015), http://
www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/01/22/law-matters-the-other-side-of-the-bench.
104. 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC).
105. Id. at paras. 4–7, 82, 91.
106. Id. at paras. 82–92.
107. See Democratic All. v. Acting Nat’ l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions 2012 (3) SA 486 (SCA) at paras. 2–3, 33, 52. 
108. See id. at para. 52; see also Stephen Grootes, DA to Return to Court Over ‘Spy Tapes,’ Eyewitness News 
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://ewn.co.za/2014/09/22/DA-to-return-to-court-over-spy-tapes.
109. Stephen Grootes, Spy Tapes: DA Gearing up to get Zuma Prosecuted for Corruption, Eyewitness News 
(Mar. 12, 2014), http://ewn.co.za/2014/12/03/Spy-tapes-DA-confident-Zuma-guilty-of-corruption.
110. Zuma Spy Tapes Corruption Case to go Back to Court, Mail & Guardian (Feb. 9, 2015), http://mg.co.za/
article/2015-02-09-zuma-spy-tapes-corruption-case-to-go-back-to-court.
111. Adam Liptak, How Activist is the Supreme Court?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2013, at SR4.
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Hlophe controversy.112 There are also disputes about the money that Zuma has spent 
“renovating” his mansion113 and allegations of a cover-up following the Marikana 
massacre,114 in which police tragically killed thirty-four miners during a “wildcat” 
strike.115 In the United States, the death of the Independent Counsel Act shows that 
the American legal system is also struggling to figure out how to deal with high-
level corruption, though international law is far less relevant there and the problem is 
far less serious. U.S. courts are nonetheless often criticized as being undemocratic.116 
But in South Africa, the Constitutional Court is key to promoting real democracy 
and negating corruption by limiting the dominant party.
112. Rabkin, supra note 103.
113. Thulani Gqirana, Zuma Doesn’t Have to Pay Back a Cent – Report, Mail & Guardian (May 29, 2015), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-29-zuma-doesnt-have-to-pay-back-a-cent-report.
114. Niren Tolsi, SAPS Rot Runs Deep in Marikana Cover-up, Mail & Guardian (July 2, 2015), http://
mg.co.za/article/2015-07-02-saps-rot-runs-deep-in-marikana-cover-up.
115. Charlayne Hunter-Gault, A Massacre and A Test for South Africa, The New Yorker (Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-massacre-and-a-test-for-south-africa.
116. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court’s Power Has Become Excessive, N.Y. Times: The Opinion Pages 
Room for Debate, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/06/is-the-supreme-court-too-
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